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NOTE AND COMMENT
AGENCY: THE MEASURE OF A PRINCIPAL'S
LIABILITY FOR A SLANDER BY HIS AGENT
A recent Montana decision, Keller v. Safeway Stores, seems,
possibly, to be charging the principal for the acts of his agent
committed outside the scope of his authority.
The facts of the case are, briefly stated, that Cobb, manager
of the Safeway Store, slandered the plaintiff at the home of the
plaintiff's mother. The purpose of the visit was to ". . . straight-
en out the address, or to obtain payment to make good the no
good check." Though the evidence was conflicting, the defense
maintained that Cobb had been instructed by his superiors that
"anyone taking a personal check would do so on their own re-
sponsibility." In approving a judgment for the plaintiff,' ap-
parently the Court assumes that the store may have given such
an instruction. The language of the case causing the trouble
is as follows:
"At best, under these circumstances, the question
whether the manager in accepting a bad check did so on
behalf of the store was one for the jury to decide. But even
if we assume that he was not the agent acting within the
express scope of his employment while attempting to collect
the check, we still have a question for the jury whether the
slander grew out of acts incidental to the employment."
"The jury might have believed that the visit to the
home of the plaintiff's mother was so closely intermingled
with the employment Cobb was expressly authorized to do,
and that the ensuing slander was a wrong committed, if not
in furtherance of his employment, at least as an incident
thereto-either would be sufficient to bind the company.'
1(1940) 111 Mont. 28, 108 P. (2d) 605.
'Though the general rule was formerly contra, Montana Is following
the weight of authority today, that a corporation is liable for a slander
uttered by its employee within the course of his employment. Waters-
Pierce Oil Co. v. Bridwell (1912) 103 Ark. 345, 147 S. W. 64, Ann.
Cas. 1914B, 837; Jordan v. Melville Shoe Corp. (1928) 150 Va. 101, 142
S. E. 387; 13 Am. Jun., Corporatloim, §1127; RESTATEMENT, AoENcY,
§247 comment b. Contra: Singer Mfg. Co. v. Taylor (1906) 150 Ala.
574, 43 So. 210, 9 L. R. A. (N. S.) 929, 124 Am. St. Rep. 90.
8111 Mont. 28, 40, 108 P. (2d) 605, 612. All italics in this quotation are
supplied.
'This language Is directly contrary to established Agency rules. Acts
not done for the purpose of promoting the principal's business are not
within the scope of the agent's authority. Neither does an act done in
furtherance of the principal's business charge the latter unless it Is
committed in the execution of an admitted authority. 35 Am. Jun,
Ma8ter and Servant, §552; Agency, 2 C. J. p. 853; 2 MECHEM, AGENCY
(2d ed. 1914) §1882, p. 1462; RESTATEMENT, AoENCY, §§228, 235, 236.
However, this statement by the court must be merely loose language
since in another part of the decision they quote the rule on this point
as it is stated in Corpus Juris.
1
Angstman: Measure of a Principal's Liability for a Slander by His Agent
Published by The Scholarly Forum @ Montana Law, 1942
MONTANA LAW REVIEW
The authority delegated to Cobb did not expressly include
the making of defamatory statements, but if their making
was incidental to his employment, then the principal was
liable. The wrong here-the slander-taken at its face
value, can reasonably be said to have been an intende'd
means by which Cobb expected to obtain payment on the no
good check. Clearly, had he been attempting to get pay-
ment on behalf of the store and in so doing uttered the
slanderous words, the store would have been liable."
This quotation and particularly the last sentence suggests
that, even though it be granted that Cobb and his principal
understood that the former had no authority to collect checks
on the latter's behalf, nevertheless, the jury might reasonably
charge the principal for the slander by finding that it was "in-
cidental to the employment." Neither the generally recognized
rules of Agency, nor any special rules that may exist for impos-
ing tort liability on the principal, would support such a rule.
So, the purpose of- this article is to determine whether the case
may be so interpreted as to be brought within the generally rec-
ognized Agency doctrines.
Ordinarily, the law treats the question of the ultimate scope
of the agent's authority as a question of fact,' based on the pre-
mise that the law seeks to give effect to that authority actually
intended by the principal," as reasonably interpreted objectively,
both from his words and from his acts or conduct, in much the
same way as is the mutual intent of the parties to a contract
generally ascertained. That being true, in the absence of posi-
tive evidence of the limits of the authority found in the prin-
cipal's instructions to the agent, there are certain fairly definite
'Ellinghouse v. Ajax Livestock Co. (1915) 51 Mont. 275, 152 P. 481,
L. R. A. 1916D, 836; Hoffman v. Roehl (1921) 61 Mont. 290, 203 P.
349, 20 A. L. R. 184; Master and Servant, 39 C. J. p. 1362; 2 MECHEM,
AGENCY (2d ed. 1914) §1982, p. 1547; RESTATEMENT, AGENCY, §228
comment d.
'When the law imposes liability on the principal-agency relationship,
notwithstanding that the principal and agent did not intend for there
to be such relationship In fact, then the relationship is one raised
solely by operation of law, and is no longer a question of fact for the
jury. An agency strictly by operation of law however is a rare thing.
1 MECHEM, AGENCY (2d ed. 1914) §§29, 203, pp. 15, 149. But some of
the Court's language (principally the last sentence in the part quoted
in the body of this article) makes it hard to conclude that the Court
intended to find an authority in fact in Cobb to collect the check on
belalf of the Safeway Store, but might be interpreted as imposing lia-
bility by operation of law. Such a possibility indicates that the Court
may have had in the back of its mind the doctrine of distribution of
risk-advocated by modern writers for placing the burden of risk
where it can best be borne. Stevens, The Test of the Employment Re-
lation, 38 (Part 1) MICH. L. REv. 188 (1939-40); Douglas, Vicarious
Liability and Administration of Risk, 38 YALE L. J. 584 (1929).
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criteria guiding the jury in ascertaining that intention, which
they should be given by careful instructions. Those criteria
commonly recognized to ascertain the scope of the agent's au-
thority are:'
Express authority: that authority found to be directly and
intentionally conferred by the voluntary act of the principal,
oral or written;
Incidental or implied authority: that authority found by
giving effect to all those acts which are reasonably necessary
and proper to carry into effect the main authority;
Customary authority: that authority found by giving ef-
fect to those relevant customs and usages which the principal
must have anticipated;
Previous course of dealings: that authority found to have
been inferred in a present transaction because it existed in pre-
vious transactions between the parties;
Authority by necessity: that authority found to be reason-
ably necessary to protect the principal's interests when an un-
foreseen emergency has arisen and immediate action is required;
Apparent authority: that authority found to permit the
exercise of those powers which the principal has, by his direct
act or conduct, caused the person dealing with the agent reason-
ably to believe that the principal has conferred, and upon which
that person has relied.
Much is said in the opinion about the slander being "inci-
dental to the employment.' For the moment it is assumed that
the word "employment" is equivalent to the word "authority"
71 MECHEM, AGENCY (2d ed. 1914) §§714-721, pp. 501-510; RESTATE-
MENT, AGENCY, §§8, 26, 27, 35, 36, 47. Agency by estoppel may be con-
sidered an additional criterion but probably it is not a real authority.
1 MECHEM, AGENCY (2d ed. 1914) §§722-726, pp. 510-513; RESTATEMENT,
AGENCY, §§31, 159; cf. 2 AM. Jun., Agency, §104. Liability by ratifica-
tion is often treated in this same group but it is really different in
kind. 1 MEcHEm, AGENCY (2d ed. 1914) §727, p. 513; RESTATEMENT,
AGENCY, §82.
8The Court should use every possible means to avoid allowing the
phrase "incidental to the employment" to be used as a basis for estab-
lishing a standard for measuring tort liability generally, resembling
in any way the one which seems to have been approved by it in at
least some cases (and so roundly criticized today) for measuring the
agent's power to make statements against the principal's interest so as
to charge the latter therefor. See in this issue comment by Bill Hirst,
p. 81. The very real danger of such an unfortunate evolution of the rule
governing tort liability is made manifest by the casual language of the
Court in Earlywine v. C. I. T. Corporation (1940) 110 Mont. 295, 101
P. (2d) 59, where the phrase "merely an incident of the res gestae"
appears. As the phrases "incidental to the employment" and "an in-
cident of the employment" are used in our principal case, just what Is
the difference in their meaning from that of the phrase "an incident
of the res gestae," used in the Earlywine case's headnotes?
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as here used. To be incidental to the express authority, so as to
be included in the total actual authority, given acts must be such
as "usually accompany it, or are reasonably necessary to accom-
plish it.'" Therefore, though the collecting of the check might
conceivably be incidental in this sense, to an already established
authority to accept the check--or perhaps better, to his general
managerial authority' ° -the slander itself cannot be incidental in
that sense.' (Probably it would be better if the term "inci-
dental," as applied to the slander itself, was not used at all.)
However, after having established by some one of the above
criteria that Cobb was acting for the defendant in collecting the
check, it becomes proper then to talk about the defendant being
liable because the slander was in an attempted furtherance of
his admitted authority.
But it may be suggested that the criteria for establishing
the "scope of the agent's authority" result in a narrower au-
thority than do those for measuring the "scope of a servant's
employment" delimiting his "power" to charge his principal
in tort. As indicated in the Restatement of the Law of Agency,
generally the principal is chargeable with the torts of the agent
provided they are sufficiently "similar to or incidental to the
conduct authorized,"" and, too, are inspired "at least in part,
by a purpose to serve the master."'" But these sections were
formulated with reference to the particular act complained of-
here, the slander,-and are pertinent only after first finding
that the slander was uttered in the execution of an admitted
authority. The Restatement points this out explicitly:
"The manifestations of the master determine what con-
duct may be within the scope of employment, since it in-
cludes only acts of the kind authorized." . . . Proof that the
actor was in the general employment of the master does not
of itself create an inference that a given act done by him
was within the scope of employment. If, however, it is also
proved that the act tended to accomplish an authorized
9RESTATEMENT, AGENCY, §35.
'1 MECHEM, AGENCY (2d ed. 1914) §996, p. 719; RESTATEMENT, AGENCY,§73.
"This does not mean that the act directly causing the injury com-
plained of may not be incidental to the admitted authority. That
depends on the character of the admitted authority. If the principal
tells the agent to recapture the former's chattels from the possession
of another, even a forcible taking might be so "incidental," thus mak-
ing the principal liable for the resulting assault. RESTATEMENT,
AGENCY, §229 comment b.
"RESTATEMENT, AGENCY, §229.
"RESTATEMENT, AGENCY, §228.
"4RESTATEMENT, AGENCY, §228 comment a.
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purpose" and was done at an authorized place and time,
there is an inference that it was within the scope of em-
ployment. '
Thus, it is just as important to determine whether Cobb was
authorized to collect the check on behalf of the store for the
purpose of deciding tort liability as for any other reason. What-
ever may be the differentiations between "scope of authority"
and "scope of employment," there is no rule under either of
them holding a principal liable for the torts of an agent com-
mitted in furtherance of an object not understood by either to
be included in the agent's authority.
Granted that for our purposes it is necessary to determine
whether Cobb had real authority to collect the check for his prin-
cipal, one may ask whether the Court does not really base its
decision upon the proposition above suggested-that the au-
thority to collect may be found to exist as an incident to the
managerial authority." The decision does not seem formally to
have recognized the distinction between the authority to accept
the check and the authority to collect it, but it must have de-
cided that the jury was justified in finding that Cobb had the
authority to accept the check on behalf of the store; and, fur-
ther, that it was for them to determine what acts were incidental
to his managerial authority. Hence the jury might have found
that the authority to collect the check followed naturally and
ordinarily from the authority to accept it as manager. So, in
attempting to collect the check, Cobb was acting within the
scope of his employment. The Safeway Store is, therefore, li-
able for the slander, not because Cobb was attempting to
straighten out an address on behalf of the store, since the sland-
er did not result therefrom, but because, although he may have
"Italics supplied.
"RESTATEMENT, AGENCY, §228 comment b.
"The Court states that, even under the defendant's version of the au-
thority of their managers in taking a check for groceries sold, the
latter could accept any and all checks, promoting the store's business
in any event, but simply being responsible therefor if the check turned
out to be bad. This might suggest that there is in the Court's mind
the proposition that one cannot enter into what, in substance, is a
principal-agency relationship, and then seek to avold its liabilities by
calling it something else-or by adding to the relationship some of the
normal incidents of some other relationship. That the defendant can-
not "run with the hare or hold with the hounds" is well established.
Snelling v. Arbuckle Bros. (1898) 104 Ga. 362, 30 S. H. 863; and see,
Arbuckle Bros. v. Kirkpatrick (1897) 98 Tenn. 221, 39 S. W. 3, 36
L. R. A. 285, 60 Am. St. Rep. 854; Arbuckle Bros. v. Gates and Brown(1898) 95 Va. 802, 30 S. E. 496. But it is very doubtful that the facts
of the present case would justify applying the above rule. Neither
does the Court appear to intend so to apply it.
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been acting partly for his own interests, he was also acting in
furtherance of the principal's business and within the scope
of his authority in attempting to collect the check."
These conclusions may be supported not only by the fact
that the Court treats the problem as a jury question, and too,
by the fact that there is no real indication of an intention by the
Court. to state a new measure of liability, but also by several
cases cited in support of its decision. For example, in Kirk v.
Montana Transfer Co.," an agent was employed to move furni-
ture and collect therefor. Either in completing the job of mov-
ing a refrigerator or in attempting to seize it as security for the
bill for moving the goods, and while the plaintiff physically re-
sisted the taking, the agent threw it against the plaintiff, injur-
ing her. It was a rule of the defendant company that when
drivers were notified that work done by them should be paid
for at completion, unless they collected therefor, the amount
would be deducted from their wages. The defendant was held
liable. Here the agent was expressly authorized to make collec-
tions, while in the principal case there is no such express author-
ization. Therefore, the Court must have ruled that the jury
was justified in finding an authority in Cobb to collect the
check or the cases would be distinguishable.' Also, in both cases
the agents would have to stand the loss personally if the collec-
tions were not made. Still, in both cases the principals were
properly held liable for the assault and slander respectively, be-
cause, although the agents may have been acting partly for their
own interests, they were also acting in furtherance of their prin-
cipals' businesses, within the scope of their authority, express
or implied.
So the Court in the principal case has reached the proper
result. Much of the language is ambiguous and on first reading
seems to be contrary to the established rules of Agency; but, if
it is interpreted as finding an authority in Cobb to collect the
check, the decision can be justified.
-Albert C. Angstman.
'
8cf. RESTATEMENT, AGENCY, §236.
'( 191 9 ) 56 Mont. 292, 184 P. 987.
2°The following cited cases are similarly analogous: Son v. Hartford
Ice Cream Co. (1925) 102 Conn. 696, 129 A. 778; Atlanta Hub Co. v.
Jones (1933) 47 Ga. App. 778, 171 S. E. 470; Moffit v. White Sewing
Mach. Co. (1921) 214 Mich. 496, 183 N. W. 198; Russell-Locke Super-
Service Co. v. Vaughn (1935) 170 Okl. '377, 40 P. (2d) 1090.
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